Creatio Ex Nihilo
At Once a Proposition and a Rebuttal
Circles in a Circle by Wassily Kandinsky, 1923
A very long time ago (about last Thursday), I beheld a deduction so remarkable that… well, I felt the need to remark upon it. Now that you are all aware of the captivating events by which this writing was conceived (and will doubtless thank me for telling you), I shall proceed unperturbedly.
The purpose of my writing is to address a Proof (it aspires to be such, at least) through which the ex nihilo account of creation is, supposedly, “doomed”. This proof was proposed by a certain Daniel Guy, and - as much of what follows is in direct response to his writing - I have linked the original text here: A proof for the impossibility of creation ex nihilo.
Now, I tend to share Mr. Guy’s suspicion of logical proofs, and I am especially hesitant to accept a Proof which I find written in majuscule letters. As such, I must confess that I did not anticipate being convinced by his argument, nor was I convinced any of the twelve times that I read it. I would like to stress, however, how really appreciative I am of his effort, and how delighted I would be to have his thoughts below.
As to the proof itself: I shall assert, as Anselm’s critics did of him, that Guy is simply defining his conclusion into existence. He has taken a vague term (namely, metaphysical) and construed it such that his conclusion must follow. There is little chance of my repenting here (since I happen to be correct), but I am nevertheless quite willing to be wrong.
Begging the Question
Daniel Guy’s first premise states that, “Whatever is created ex nihilo is completely metaphysically dependent on God.” This seems to be an acceptable premise, until he claims (to justify premise IV) that complete metaphysical dependency must include a constitutive (or, material) dependency. Yet, if this is true, then his desired conclusion is couched within the ambiguous terminology of his first premise. He has simply defined creatio ex nihilo into non-existence.
Put simply, there are two understandings of “metaphysical dependency” which could be supplied here:
Ontological dependency, inclusive of constitutive relationships (at which point, the argument would follow, but the first premise would be unacceptable to most people).
Ontological dependency, exclusive of constitutive relationships (at which point, everyone would accept the first premise, but the argument would not follow.)
Either way, the argument is unpersuasive.
Constitutive Dependency
But why shouldn’t it still be true? Why shouldn’t a material independence entail a metaphysical (or rather, ontological) independence? The problem with this, of course, is that the material constitution of a thing is determined by (and is, therefore, dependent upon) the agent who brought it into existence. Hence, the only way for a material thing to be metaphysically independent is if it had somehow caused its own material constitution, or if it had existed in itself eternally. Both of these options, however, conflict with the idea of ex nihilo creation.
Moreover, the constitution of all material things must terminate in something that is “constitutively independent” - some primordial substance that has neither parts nor representation. This, at least, is the most common view, and the one that Daniel Guy seems to adhere to. But the fact that this primordial substance (whatever that may be) has neither parts nor representation does not, of course, preclude it from having an origin. And if that origin happens to be a timeless, immaterial being who grounds the existence of this mereologically simple substance (as say, the representable expression of His immaterial spirit), then upon what grounds can we say that creation is ungrounded? We should be careful, here, not to conflate creation exclusively with “the world as we conceive of it”. That is, after all, a subjective denotation.
The Proposition
Let us grant, however, that creatio ex nihilo must entail every kind of dependency - both material and ontological in nature. We would still have to establish what is here called “constitutive dependency” as a real category into which material objects can fall. I would propose, to this end, that material constitution is not so much a matter of being as it is a matter of perception. All things for which we have a correlative concept (chairs, for example) are materially reducible to a non-reducible substance, such that the concept itself does not exist materially-speaking (cf. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics). If this is true, then the constitution of a thing does not exist except insofar as it is representable to a concious being. So as to avoid confusion, let us consider the conventional distinction between the “right” and the “left” side of a car. Does this distinction exist outside of our own conceptual sphere? It would seem not. To say, then, that a car is constituted of a right and a left side is certainly true, but it is not exclusively true. The distinction exists in the understanding; it does not inhere to the matter itself.
Sincerely,
E.K. Barber
Brilliant Work as always Mr. E.K. Barber